Dela Cruz v People (2014, G.R. No. 200748)

Jaime dela Cruz v People

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

Dela Cruz was arrested for extortion but he was subjected to drug test which yielded positive results. SC: the drug test conducted was immaterial to the charge of extortion, hence within the protection of the right of the accused against self-incrimination. The drug test in this case is not a purely mechanical act.

Facts:

            Family of a suspect arrested claimed that Dela Cruz attempted to extort money from them, in exchange for the freedom of the suspect. Dela Cruz was arrested in an entrapment operation for extortion but was then subjected to a urine drug testing. The test yielded positive results, and Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Sec 15 of RA 9165. Dela Cruz failed to question the validity of his arrest.

 

Issue: W/N the failure of Dela Cruz to question the validity of his arrest is also a waiver to question the admissibility of evidence obtained during an illegal warrantless arrest.

 

Held: No, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 

 

            Therefore, Dela Cruz can question the admissibility of the positive drug test results. The same is inadmissible as evidence in Court because (1) the drug test conducted was illegal, and (2) the drug test is not material to the charge of extortion.

 

Re drug testing of arrested persons (Section 15, RA 9165)

 

            The phrase must be read in consonance with RA 9165: i.e., the person arrested can be subjected to drug testing if they are arrested for unlawful acts listed under RA 9165. Dela Cruz was initially charged with extortion, thus the drug test conducted was not sanctioned by RA 9165 because extortion is not a violation under RA 9165. 

 

Re right of an accused against self-incrimination

 

            This right proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. In its essence is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.

 

Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 

 

In the instant case, a urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion.

Malacat v CA (1997, G.R. No. 123595)

 

Sammy Malacat v CA and People

G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997

Malacat was standing among a group of Muslim men in Quiapo whom the police suspected because their eyes were "moving fast". A warrantless arrest cannot be justified where no crime is being committed at the time of the arrest because no crime may be inferred from the fact that the eyes of the person arrested were "moving fast" and "looking at every person" passing by.

Facts:

In August 1990, the police, acting on bomb threats, was on foot patrol in Quiapo, wherein they saw some groups of Muslim men "acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast". The police approached a group, who fled in different directions. Malacat was caught and a fragmentation grenade was found in his possession (in violation of PD 1866).

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

Held: The warrantless search and seizure was invalid. There was nothing in petitioner's behavior which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". 

Such observation is hard to accept as the police were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. The police claim the search to be valid as incidental to lawful arrest, but the arrest of Malacat was invalid as it does not fall under any of the exceptions in Rule 113, Section 5 (in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit, or escapee exceptions).

Warrantless searches valid in the following:

1. customs search
2. search of moving vehicles
3. seizure of evidence in plain view
4. consent searches
5. incidental to lawful arrest
6. "stop and frisk"

Stop and Frisk v. Search incidental to lawful arrest

• In a search incidental to a lawful arrest
• the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search
• the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases
• whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 
• Stop-and-Frisk
• "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons"
• while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk"

Luz v People (2012, GR No. 197788)

Rodel Luz v People

G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

 

Facts:

            In March 2003, Luz was flagged down by the police for driving a motorcycle without helmet, in violation of an ordinance. Luz was invited to the nearby police sub-station, and while he was there, the police noticed that Luz was uneasy and holding something in his pocket. Upon instruction by the police, Luz took out the contents of his pocket, among which was shabu and a swiss knife.

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure following an arrest for a traffic violation was valid.

 

Held: There was no valid arrest. Roadside questioning of a motorist is not considered as custodial interrogation nor arrest.

 

Under RA 4136, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. The PNP Operations Manual also provides that in cases of traffic violations, mere issuance of citation ticket or violation report is needed, and there is no need for conversing with the driver. 

 

At the time that he was waiting for his citation ticket, Luz could not be said to have been "under arrest." Arrestis the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. There was no intention to arrest Luz, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. 

 

Usual traffic stop is more analogous to “Terry stop”. The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion that they are subject to the dictates of Miranda. 

There are two features of a traffic stop: 

 

1.     detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief

 

2.     circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police, for instance, because the typical traffic stop is public

 

Lastly, while Luz may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

 

 

 

 

 

 

People v Yau (2014, G.R. No. 208170)

People v Petrus and Susana Yau

G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014

Yau spouses were charged with kidnapping for ransom and illegal detention of an American lawyer. They questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest. SC: Yau spouses failed to question the validity of their arrest before arraignment, thus any objection is deemed waived. EVEN IF the arrest was illegal, this cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

 

Facts:

            Petrus was charged as principal of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention (RPC A267), while Susana was charged as accomplice, allegedly for the kidnapping of an American lawyer (Alastair Onglingswam) in January 2004, while the victim hailed a cab driven by Petrus in Mandaluyong City. Alastair was kept for 22 days in a house owned by Susana, until the police rescued Alastair. The offenders allegedly demanded for 600K USD ransom.

 

            According to the police, during the rescue operation on February 11, 2004, the police flagged down Petrus’ cab, asked him to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Petrus did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Petrus brought the police to his house, and there they found Alastair.

 

            According to Petrus, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and after he alighted from his car, 3 men bigger than him held his hands, pushed him inside their van and beat him until he became unconscious. When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. He was still restrained and blindfolded, and then was beat up. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest was valid.

 

Held: The accused are deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrest because they failed to raise the objection before they entered their pleas.

 

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 

 

The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. 

 

The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

 

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

 

 

 

 

Pestilos et al v Generoso and People (2014, G.R. No. 182601)

Joey Pestilos et al v Atty. Moreno Generoso and People

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

 

 

Facts:

            In February 2005, petitioners, and Atty. Generoso had an altercation in the latter’s house, and the latter called the police who came to render assistance. The police saw Generoso badly beaten. Generoso pointed to the petitioners as the ones who mauled him, thus the police “invited” them to Batasan Hills Police Station.

 

            They allegedly stabbed Generoso, but the latter survived. As such, the petitioners were charged with attempted murder. 

 

    They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

 

Issue: W/N the “invitation” by the police was a valid warrantless arrest.

 

Held: There was valid warrantless arrest.

The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

 

 

Doctrine:

 

-       History of warrantless arrests:

o   Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

o   Under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

o   More restrictive 1985 Rules of Court: it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for investigation.

§  Changes adopted to minimize arrests based on hearsay:

·      1) the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and

·       2) the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.