Abejo v COA (2022, G.R. No. 251967)

 Bernadette Abejo (Exec Dir of ICAB) v COA

June 14, 2022, G.R. No. 251967

Abejo approved the additional renumeration given to ICAB members who helped in the workload of ICPC when there was a heavy load of applications in 2008-2010. COA said the same had no legal basis. SC: the disallowance was valid, but Abejo, due to good faith, cannot be held liable to return.

Facts: 

    The 1995 Inter-Country Adoption Act (RA 8043) created ICAB, which is the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption and policy-making body for carrying out RA 8043. 

    The Inter-Country Adoption Placement Committee (ICPC) is under the direction of ICAB, is tasked to screen, review, evaluate, and eventually decide upon and approve applications of prospective adoptive parents (or PAPs Dossiers).

    Allegedly, there was a heavy load of applications from 2008-2010, thus, ICAB members were asked to help with the review of PAPs Dossiers. Unnumbered memoranda were issued by the undersecretary to compensate the ICAB members.

    COA disallowed the additional renumeration on the following basis: (1) grant has no legal basis, (2) contrary to DBM BC No. 2003-5 and Sec. 49 of RA 9970 (GAA), (3) the Legal Service of DSWD issued a memorandum denying the grant, and (4) Sec 5 of RA 8043 states that ICAB members are only entitled to a per diem of 1,500.

Issues: 

1. W/N COA correctly disallowed the additional remuneration given to ICAB members.

2. W/N Abejo, as Executive Director and approving officer, should be held liable.  

Held: The disallowance is AFFIRMED, but Abejo is ABSOLVED from her solidary liability to return the disallowed amount.

1. While additional work done outside of a government official's regular function may be compensated, the grant of such compensation must still be in accordance with the applicable laws and rules.

    Honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right, and the granting of the same must follow the relevant rules. RA 8043 and DBM BC No. 2003-5 prevents ICAB members from receiving additional compensation for the work they have done reviewing PAPs Dossiers. Further, this is not a special project as referred to in RA 9970 (Sec 49). 

    RA 8043 is clear as to the limit of the amount per diem the ICAB members are to receive.

    DBM BC No. 2003-5 prohibits the payment of honoraria to officers already receiving per diem, e.g. ICAB members. 

2. Badges of good faith could be appreciated in favor of Abejo. No prior disallowance of the same benefit has been adjudged against ICAB. There is also no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence.

Doctrines:

• general rule (procedural): 
• the filing of an MOR is an indispensable condition before the special civil action for certiorari could be availed of.
• XPNS according to Del Rosario v ABS-CBN (Sep 2020, G.R. No. 202481, etc).
• Madera Rules (Madera v COA, G.R. NO. 244128, Sept 8, 2020)
• set of rules in determining the liability of government officers and employees being made to return employee benefits that were disallowed in audit:
1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.
2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
• If in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family, they are not liable to return.
• If in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, liable to return

Gatchalian v Urrutia (2022, G.R. No. 223595)

 Sherwin T. Gatchalian v Romeo V. Urrutia

March 16, 2022, G.R. No. 223595

Facts:

    This is a review of a CSC decision. 

    Gatchalian is a former Mayor while Urrutia was a Records Officer in the Council Secretariat.

    In January 2012, Elizabeth Laron, an OJT working in the City Government of Valenzuela Employees Cooperative, lodged a complaint against Urrutia for sexual harassment committed in December 2011. Roberto Darilag, Chairman of the Personnel Complaints and Ethics Board (PCEB),  ordered Urrutia to submit his counter-affidavit, but before Urrutia could do the same, Darilag sent a letter to Laron advising her to amend her complaint to comply with the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases (CSC Res. No. 01-0940). The Committee recommended that Gatchalian file a formal charge against Urrutia and preventively suspend him, which the former obliged.

    CSC dismisses the case. Ground: Urrutia was an employee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, appointed by the Vice Mayor (Sec 456, LGC); thus, the Mayor is not authorized to issue a formal charge against Urrutia.

Issue: W/N the Mayor has no jurisdiction to discipline the SP employee (following the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint).

Held: Gatchalian as mayor had the power to issue a formal charge and a preventive suspension order against Urrutia.

Sec 455(b)(1)(x) of LGC provides that the Mayor can cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city who may have committed and offense in the performance of his official duties.

Sec 87 of LGC also empowers the Chief Executive to impose appropriate penalty on erring subordinate employees under her/his jurisdiction.

Doctrines:

• Doctrine of implication in relation to Sec 456, LGC:
• VM's power to appoint employees of the SP carries with it the power to discipline the same employees
• General rule re appointment and discipline
• the power to appoint carries with it the power to discipline.
• XPN: the power to discipline/remove is expressly vested in another office or authority.
• CSC Res. No. 01-0940 (Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases)
• applies to government employees 
• Sec 7, Rule VI provides that the a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) must be constituted in all agencies with the original charter. 

SSS v Violeta Simacas (2022, G.R. No. 217866)

 SSS v. Violeta Simacas

June 20, 2022, G.R. No. 217866

Violeta's husband worked in a factory handling stainless steel. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer and died. Violeta claimed for death benefits which the Commission denied since prostate cancer is not listed as an occupational disease. SC: It suffices to establish that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease.

Facts:

Irnido, husband of the appellee (Violeta) was a Fabricaiton Helper at FIELDSTAR from 1995 to 2010. Two years before retiring,  Irnido complained of back pains and incessant coughing. In 2010, he was diagnosed with "Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy (BHP) T/C (to consider) Prostatic Cancer and Pneumonia vs. Pulmonary Tuberculosis." He retired in February 2010, and died in July 2010.

Violeta filed a claim for employee's compensation benefits, denied by SSS (ground: the death was a non-occupational disease). It was ruled that prostatic adenocarcinoma or prostate cancer was not considered an occupational disease.

CA reversed the decision and ordered SSS to pay Violeta's claim for death benefits. Grounds:

• PD 626 is a social legislation that must be liberally interpreted in favor of claims
• It was impossible to present evidence of causal relation since the specific cause for prostate caner is medically unknown.
• "obligation to present such impossible evidence...must, therefore, be deemed void"

Issue: W/N Violeta is entitled to death benefits under PD 626, as amended.

Held: Yes, Violeta is entitled to death benefits. A review of the records reveal that Violeta proved that Irnido's working conditions increased the risk of him contracting prostate cancer.

Violeta cited medical journals stating that work-related exposures to certain substances (e.g. chromium) have the potential of affecting the risk of getting prostate cancer. A study also stated that "workers engaged in the manufacturing or handling stainless steel are exposed to chromium at varying degrees".

Doctrines:

• For a non-occupational disease to be compensable, substantial evidence must be presented to prove that the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the employee's working conditions. 
• it suffices to establish that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions
• not necessary to show direct causal relation
• "It is enough that the hypothesis on which the claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is the touchstone." (Sarmiento v ECC, 1986)
• Substantial evidence: such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• LC defines sickness as: 
• any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
• If non-occupational disease
• Proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions

Ting v. Heirs of Lirio (2007, G.R. No. 168913)

 Rolando Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio 

March 14, 2007, G.R. No. 168913

Lirio applied for and was granted title to a lot in Cebu in 1976, and the Court ordered the issuance of the title in 1982. Ting applied for title to the same lot in 1997. In 2003, the heirs of Lirio used as basis the 1976 decision to dismiss the application of Ting. SC: court decisions in land registration constitutes res judicata even if the issuance of title is delayed.

Facts:

Lirio applied for and was granted title to a lot in Cebu in 1976, and the Court ordered the issuance of the title in 1982. Ting applied for title to the same lot in 1997. In 2003, the heirs of Lirio used as basis the 1976 decision to dismiss the application of Ting.

Issue: W/N the 1976 decision constitutes res judicata in the application of Ting in 1997.

Held: Yes, the 1976 decision constitutes res judicata. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.

Basis: Section 30 of PD 1529:

SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)

Doctrines:

Ministerial duty, meaning

• they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. 
• However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

Section 6, Rule 39 of Rules of Court not applicable in land registration

• in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) 
• refers to civil actions 
• not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. 
• Reason: a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. 
• In special proceedings 
• purpose: to establish a status, condition or fact (SCF) 
• in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. 
• After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
• The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

 

Esconde v J. Barlongay (1987, G.R. No. L-67583)

 Basilisa Esconde v. Hon. Samilo Barlongay & Ramon Delfin

July 31, 1987, G.R. No.  L-67583

Delfin applied for registration of his title to his land, with due notice to the Escondes based on documents during the initial hearing and survey. Esconde refused to leave the land despite the writ of possession. SC: The whole world, including the Escondes, is bound to the title. Action for reconveyance is not proper as there was no showing of irregularity or fraud in the subject title registration proceedings.

Facts:

    In 1969, Delfin applied for registration of title at the CFI and was granted in the same year. OTC No. -05002 was issued in 1971, and in 1978, Delfin filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Esconde. Esconde also filed a complaint for reconveyance against Delfin. 

    The writ of possession was issued and the sheriff delivered the property to Delfin, but Esconde re-entered the premisses. In 1983, Delfin filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession. But Delfin was still barred by Esconde from entering the premises, and so the former asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family.

Issue: W/N the Escondes are bound by the certificate of title when they claim to only come to know of the land registration case upon receipt of petition for writ of possession?

Held: The Escondes are bound. There are records that they received due notice (in the notice of initial hearing they were said to have appeared, and in the survey notification letter, Esconde's husband signed as one of the adjoining owners present.

    Land registration proceedings are valid and conclusive against the whole world. The land registration is binding on the whole world because “by the description in the notice (of initial hearing of the application for registration) “To Whom It May Concern,” all the world are made parties defendant.”

    Reconveyance is not the proper remedy in this case because there is no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title. It was also not established that there was fraud.

Doctrines:

• The applicable law in this case is Act 496 as PD 1529 was enacted only in Jan. 23, 1979.

• It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value

• There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code).

Reconveyance as a remedy

• remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him
• does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. 
• does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration,
• does not seek to set aside the decree 
• respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner 
• Prescription: An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title

Castillo v Escutin (2009, G.R. No. 171056)

 Dinah C. Castillo v. Antonio Escutin et al.

March 13, 2009, G.R. No. 171056

Castillo's tax declaration was cancelled and around the same time, Summit Realty's TCT over the same lot was issued based on the title of Catigbac. As ROD and City Assessor's Office has processed the documents of Summit, Castillo charged them with violation of RA 3019 on corrupt practices. SC: the title of Catigbac has superior right over the tax declaration of Castillo. Absent any sign of irregularities, the officers cannot be charged with corrupt practices.

Facts:

    Castillo filed charges against the respondents for violation of RA 3019 for allegedly cancelling her TCT in favor of Summit Realty. Castillo was a judgement credit of Moratilla, and to satisfy said judgment Castillo went after Lot 13713 co-owned by Moratilla. Said lot was part of the area which Summit applied for conversion from agricultural landholding to residential, commercial, and recreational uses.

    To satisfy the judgment credit, said lot was subject to public auction sale in May 2002, and Castillo bought 1/3 pro-indiviso share of the lot. Castillo then obtained Tax Declaration 00942-A for the same. When Castillo attempted to pay real estate taxes, she found out that her TD was cancelled, and the area was encompassed in TCT No. 129642 and TD 00949-A in the name of Francisco Catigbac, and supposedly sold to Summit.

    In July 2002, TCT 129642 was cancelled and TCT T-134609 was issued in favor of Summit. As such, Castillo charted several public officers for the said cancellation and transfer of ownership of the subject lot. 

    

Issue: W/N the tax declaration of Castillo can be cancelled on the basis of Section 109 of PD 1529.

Held: Petition has no merit.  Section 109 provides for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title, and not related to the cancellation of Castillo's tax declaration. The cancellation of Castillo's TD was based on the fact that the same lot is covered by TCT 181 and subsequently by TCT No. 129642.

   Accordingly, Summit bought Lot 1-B from Catigbac (through his AIF, Yagin), and thus TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac was issued covering the purchased lot, on which the sale was registered in Summit's favor. Lot 1-B was separated from Lot 1, and TCT 129642 was issued in the name of Catigbac and then the same was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit.

    Since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same property.

Title v Certificate of title

• Title: lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours
• the foundation of ownership of property (real or personal)
• that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession
• Certificate of Title: mere evidence of ownership
• not the title of the land itself

Doctrines:

• two systems of land registration 
• the registration of an instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect
• these systems are separate and distinct from each other
1. Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree
2. System of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree)

People v Pangilinan (2007, G.R. No. 171020)

 

People of the Philippines v Alfredo Pangilinan

March 14, 2007, G.R. No. 171020

Pangilinan was charged with two counts of rape against his daughter. After the hearings for the petition of bail concluded, the trial ensued without arraignment, thereafter, the court scheduled his arraignment and then the case was submitted for decision. Accused: the delay in the arraignment violated his right to be informed of the accusation against him. SC: No, the defect was cured by the accused's active participation in trial, indicating that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

Facts:

            Pangilinan was charged with two counts of rape for raping his daughter, AAA (11 years old) in 1995 and in 1997. Timeline of the case was as follows:

• March 19, 1997: Pangilinan  was arrested
• May 5, 1997: Pangilinan arrested and detained with no bail recommended. Thereafter, accused filed a petition for bail and hearings for the petition for bail followed. Prosecution presented AAA's mother and the doctor who examined AAA as witnesses. Pangilinan was his sole witness.
• April 23, 1998: RTC denied Pangilinan's petition for bail (ground: the evidence against the accused is strong)
• June 9, 1999: RTC scheduled his arraignment
• June 17, 1999: accused pleaded not guilty, and in September, the court found him guilty.

        Accused appealed his conviction on the ground that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision. An irregularity and a procedural error which is prejudicial to the accused and tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. 

Issue: W/N arraignment after the case was submitted for decision was a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the accusation against him. 

Held: Pangilinan's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.  His counsel also actively participated in the hearings, which is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

            Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

                It's purpose is to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. Or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the sate is mobilized against him. 

Doctrine:

• three principles in determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases

1. an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even difficult for the accused to disprove

2. there are only two persons involved in this crime, and as such the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution

3. The evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

            

• Rule on affidavits: being taken ex parte, they are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries but he investigating officer or du got partial suggestions, and are thus generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.

• It is when the testimony (in rape cases) appears totally flawless that a court might have some misgiving on its veracity. This is especially true in rape cases where victims are not expected to have a total recall of the incident.

Spouses Marimla v People (2009, G.R. N0. 158467)

 

Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla v. People of the Philippines, et al.

G.R. No. 158467, July 23, 2009

 

Facts:

            In February 2002, an investigator and a witness applied for a search warrant in RTC-Manila to search the house of spouses Marimla in Pampanga, based on their personal knowledge of the spouses’ violation of RA 6425 (drugs).

 

            The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized on the following grounds: 

(1)   the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; 

(2)   the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; 

(3)   the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and 

(4)   the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

 

Issues: 

 

1.     W/N the search warrant issued by RTC Manila was valid despite the house searched being in Pampanga.

 

2.     W/N the search warrant issued is valid despite not being personally endorsed by the NBI Head, but only endorsed by a Deputy Director.

 

Held: 

 

1.     The search warrant is valid. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.

 

 

 

2.     The search warrant is valid. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. 

 

AM 99-10-09-SC

-       authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others (namely heinous crimes, illegal gambling, and illegal possession of firearms), filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

-       Applications personally endorsed by the heads of said agencies

Shell and Petron v RIGC (2015, G.R. No. 189669)

 Shell and Petron v Romars International Gases Corp

G.R. No. 189669, July 23, 2015

 

Facts:

            RIGC was charged for illegal refilling, distribution, and/or sale of LPG products under the name of Shell and Petron (violation of IPC or RA 8293, and RA 623). The NBI investigated the case and found that some of the tanks were delivered in Edrich Enterprises in Iriga City. The NBA filed for two separate Applications for Search Warrant with RTC-Naga.

            RIGC filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant for the following grounds: a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. They also filed an Appearance with Motion for Consideration, contending that the NBI should have applied for search warrant in RTC-Iriga, which has territorial jurisdiction over Edrich Enterprises.

Issue: W/N RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue search warrants when the crime was committed beyond it’s territorial jurisdiction.

Held: RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant for a criminal activity in Iriga. It is not a criminal action, and thus the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply. Moreover, RIGC failed to include the issue of jurisdiction at the first instance in its motion to quash, as such, the motion is denied.

 

Why the SC denied the motion to quash the SW on the ground of jurisdiction:

The Court would take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash in two cases (according to the omnibus motion rule), one of which is if the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Therefore, the Court denied the motion since it was not raised in the MTQ, and the court cannot take cognizance of the issue raised in the MR because it is not an issue pertaining to/questioning jurisdiction.

        The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: 

1. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
2. existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and 
3. bar by prior judgment (res judicata) or by statute of limitations.

It must be noted in Section 2(b), Rule 126, the application for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime.

A search warrant is 

-       an order in writing 

-       issued in the name of the People of the Philippines 

-       signed by a judge

-       directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court

-       in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery

-       a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity

-       the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto

o   the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.

 

Dela Cruz v People (2014, G.R. No. 200748)

Jaime dela Cruz v People

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

Dela Cruz was arrested for extortion but he was subjected to drug test which yielded positive results. SC: the drug test conducted was immaterial to the charge of extortion, hence within the protection of the right of the accused against self-incrimination. The drug test in this case is not a purely mechanical act.

Facts:

            Family of a suspect arrested claimed that Dela Cruz attempted to extort money from them, in exchange for the freedom of the suspect. Dela Cruz was arrested in an entrapment operation for extortion but was then subjected to a urine drug testing. The test yielded positive results, and Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Sec 15 of RA 9165. Dela Cruz failed to question the validity of his arrest.

 

Issue: W/N the failure of Dela Cruz to question the validity of his arrest is also a waiver to question the admissibility of evidence obtained during an illegal warrantless arrest.

 

Held: No, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 

 

            Therefore, Dela Cruz can question the admissibility of the positive drug test results. The same is inadmissible as evidence in Court because (1) the drug test conducted was illegal, and (2) the drug test is not material to the charge of extortion.

 

Re drug testing of arrested persons (Section 15, RA 9165)

 

            The phrase must be read in consonance with RA 9165: i.e., the person arrested can be subjected to drug testing if they are arrested for unlawful acts listed under RA 9165. Dela Cruz was initially charged with extortion, thus the drug test conducted was not sanctioned by RA 9165 because extortion is not a violation under RA 9165. 

 

Re right of an accused against self-incrimination

 

            This right proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. In its essence is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.

 

Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 

 

In the instant case, a urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion.

Malacat v CA (1997, G.R. No. 123595)

 

Sammy Malacat v CA and People

G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997

Malacat was standing among a group of Muslim men in Quiapo whom the police suspected because their eyes were "moving fast". A warrantless arrest cannot be justified where no crime is being committed at the time of the arrest because no crime may be inferred from the fact that the eyes of the person arrested were "moving fast" and "looking at every person" passing by.

Facts:

In August 1990, the police, acting on bomb threats, was on foot patrol in Quiapo, wherein they saw some groups of Muslim men "acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast". The police approached a group, who fled in different directions. Malacat was caught and a fragmentation grenade was found in his possession (in violation of PD 1866).

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

Held: The warrantless search and seizure was invalid. There was nothing in petitioner's behavior which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". 

Such observation is hard to accept as the police were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. The police claim the search to be valid as incidental to lawful arrest, but the arrest of Malacat was invalid as it does not fall under any of the exceptions in Rule 113, Section 5 (in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit, or escapee exceptions).

Warrantless searches valid in the following:

1. customs search
2. search of moving vehicles
3. seizure of evidence in plain view
4. consent searches
5. incidental to lawful arrest
6. "stop and frisk"

Stop and Frisk v. Search incidental to lawful arrest

• In a search incidental to a lawful arrest
• the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search
• the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases
• whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 
• Stop-and-Frisk
• "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons"
• while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk"

Luz v People (2012, GR No. 197788)

Rodel Luz v People

G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

 

Facts:

            In March 2003, Luz was flagged down by the police for driving a motorcycle without helmet, in violation of an ordinance. Luz was invited to the nearby police sub-station, and while he was there, the police noticed that Luz was uneasy and holding something in his pocket. Upon instruction by the police, Luz took out the contents of his pocket, among which was shabu and a swiss knife.

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure following an arrest for a traffic violation was valid.

 

Held: There was no valid arrest. Roadside questioning of a motorist is not considered as custodial interrogation nor arrest.

 

Under RA 4136, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. The PNP Operations Manual also provides that in cases of traffic violations, mere issuance of citation ticket or violation report is needed, and there is no need for conversing with the driver. 

 

At the time that he was waiting for his citation ticket, Luz could not be said to have been "under arrest." Arrestis the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. There was no intention to arrest Luz, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. 

 

Usual traffic stop is more analogous to “Terry stop”. The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion that they are subject to the dictates of Miranda. 

There are two features of a traffic stop: 

 

1.     detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief

 

2.     circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police, for instance, because the typical traffic stop is public

 

Lastly, while Luz may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.