Spouses Marimla v People (2009, G.R. N0. 158467)

 

Spouses Joel and Marietta Marimla v. People of the Philippines, et al.

G.R. No. 158467, July 23, 2009

 

Facts:

            In February 2002, an investigator and a witness applied for a search warrant in RTC-Manila to search the house of spouses Marimla in Pampanga, based on their personal knowledge of the spouses’ violation of RA 6425 (drugs).

 

            The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence Illegally Seized on the following grounds: 

(1)   the application for search warrant was filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and judicial region of the court where the alleged crime was committed; 

(2)   the court which issued the questioned search warrant committed grave abuse of discretion when it issued the same because under the law it cannot issue a search warrant outside its territorial jurisdiction; 

(3)   the questioned search warrant is void ab initio; and 

(4)   the evidence illegally seized by virtue of the questioned search warrant is therefore inadmissible in evidence.

 

Issues: 

 

1.     W/N the search warrant issued by RTC Manila was valid despite the house searched being in Pampanga.

 

2.     W/N the search warrant issued is valid despite not being personally endorsed by the NBI Head, but only endorsed by a Deputy Director.

 

Held: 

 

1.     The search warrant is valid. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC authorizes the Executive Judge and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, dangerous drugs and illegal possession of firearms on application filed by the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF, and REACT-TF.

 

 

 

2.     The search warrant is valid. Nothing in A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as long as it is not inconsistent with law. 

 

AM 99-10-09-SC

-       authorizes the Executive Judges and Vice Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City to act on all applications for search warrants involving dangerous drugs, among others (namely heinous crimes, illegal gambling, and illegal possession of firearms), filed by the NBI, and provides that said warrants may be served in places outside the territorial jurisdiction of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City.

-       Applications personally endorsed by the heads of said agencies

Shell and Petron v RIGC (2015, G.R. No. 189669)

 Shell and Petron v Romars International Gases Corp

G.R. No. 189669, July 23, 2015

 

Facts:

            RIGC was charged for illegal refilling, distribution, and/or sale of LPG products under the name of Shell and Petron (violation of IPC or RA 8293, and RA 623). The NBI investigated the case and found that some of the tanks were delivered in Edrich Enterprises in Iriga City. The NBA filed for two separate Applications for Search Warrant with RTC-Naga.

            RIGC filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant for the following grounds: a) there was no probable cause; (b) there had been a lapse of four weeks from the date of the test-buy to the date of the search and seizure operations; (c) most of the cylinders seized were not owned by respondent but by a third person; and (d) Edrich Enterprises is an authorized outlet of Gasul and Marsflame. They also filed an Appearance with Motion for Consideration, contending that the NBI should have applied for search warrant in RTC-Iriga, which has territorial jurisdiction over Edrich Enterprises.

Issue: W/N RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue search warrants when the crime was committed beyond it’s territorial jurisdiction.

Held: RTC-Naga has jurisdiction to issue criminal processes such as a search warrant for a criminal activity in Iriga. It is not a criminal action, and thus the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply. Moreover, RIGC failed to include the issue of jurisdiction at the first instance in its motion to quash, as such, the motion is denied.

 

Why the SC denied the motion to quash the SW on the ground of jurisdiction:

The Court would take cognizance of an issue that was not raised in the motion to quash in two cases (according to the omnibus motion rule), one of which is if the issue was one involving jurisdiction over the subject matter. However, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action, thus, the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto. Therefore, the Court denied the motion since it was not raised in the MTQ, and the court cannot take cognizance of the issue raised in the MR because it is not an issue pertaining to/questioning jurisdiction.

        The omnibus motion rule embodied in Section 8, Rule 15, in relation to Section 1, Rule 9, demands that all available objections be included in a party's motion, otherwise, said objections shall be deemed waived; and, the only grounds the court could take cognizance of, even if not pleaded in said motion are: 

1. lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; 
2. existence of another action pending between the same parties for the same cause; and 
3. bar by prior judgment (res judicata) or by statute of limitations.

It must be noted in Section 2(b), Rule 126, the application for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime.

A search warrant is 

-       an order in writing 

-       issued in the name of the People of the Philippines 

-       signed by a judge

-       directed to a peace officer, commanding him to search for personal property and bring it before the court

-       in the nature of a criminal process akin to a writ of discovery

-       a special and peculiar remedy, drastic in its nature, and made necessary because of a public necessity

-       the rule that venue is jurisdictional does not apply thereto

o   the power to issue a special criminal process is inherent in all courts.

 

Dela Cruz v People (2014, G.R. No. 200748)

Jaime dela Cruz v People

G.R. No. 200748, July 23, 2014

Dela Cruz was arrested for extortion but he was subjected to drug test which yielded positive results. SC: the drug test conducted was immaterial to the charge of extortion, hence within the protection of the right of the accused against self-incrimination. The drug test in this case is not a purely mechanical act.

Facts:

            Family of a suspect arrested claimed that Dela Cruz attempted to extort money from them, in exchange for the freedom of the suspect. Dela Cruz was arrested in an entrapment operation for extortion but was then subjected to a urine drug testing. The test yielded positive results, and Dela Cruz was charged with violation of Sec 15 of RA 9165. Dela Cruz failed to question the validity of his arrest.

 

Issue: W/N the failure of Dela Cruz to question the validity of his arrest is also a waiver to question the admissibility of evidence obtained during an illegal warrantless arrest.

 

Held: No, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during an illegal warrantless arrest. 

 

            Therefore, Dela Cruz can question the admissibility of the positive drug test results. The same is inadmissible as evidence in Court because (1) the drug test conducted was illegal, and (2) the drug test is not material to the charge of extortion.

 

Re drug testing of arrested persons (Section 15, RA 9165)

 

            The phrase must be read in consonance with RA 9165: i.e., the person arrested can be subjected to drug testing if they are arrested for unlawful acts listed under RA 9165. Dela Cruz was initially charged with extortion, thus the drug test conducted was not sanctioned by RA 9165 because extortion is not a violation under RA 9165. 

 

Re right of an accused against self-incrimination

 

            This right proscribes the use of physical or moral compulsion to extort communications from the accused and not the inclusion of his body in evidence when it may be material. In its essence is testimonial compulsion, that is, the giving of evidence against himself through a testimonial act.

 

Purely mechanical acts are not included in the prohibition as the accused does not thereby speak his guilt, hence the assistance and guiding hand of counsel is not required. 

 

In the instant case, a urine sample is not material to the charge of extortion.

Malacat v CA (1997, G.R. No. 123595)

 

Sammy Malacat v CA and People

G.R. No. 123595, December 12, 1997

Malacat was standing among a group of Muslim men in Quiapo whom the police suspected because their eyes were "moving fast". A warrantless arrest cannot be justified where no crime is being committed at the time of the arrest because no crime may be inferred from the fact that the eyes of the person arrested were "moving fast" and "looking at every person" passing by.

Facts:

In August 1990, the police, acting on bomb threats, was on foot patrol in Quiapo, wherein they saw some groups of Muslim men "acting suspiciously with their eyes moving very fast". The police approached a group, who fled in different directions. Malacat was caught and a fragmentation grenade was found in his possession (in violation of PD 1866).

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure was valid.

Held: The warrantless search and seizure was invalid. There was nothing in petitioner's behavior which could have reasonably elicited even mere suspicion other than that his eyes were "moving very fast". 

Such observation is hard to accept as the police were nowhere near petitioner and it was already 6:30 p.m., thus presumably dusk. The police claim the search to be valid as incidental to lawful arrest, but the arrest of Malacat was invalid as it does not fall under any of the exceptions in Rule 113, Section 5 (in flagrante delicto, hot pursuit, or escapee exceptions).

Warrantless searches valid in the following:

1. customs search
2. search of moving vehicles
3. seizure of evidence in plain view
4. consent searches
5. incidental to lawful arrest
6. "stop and frisk"

Stop and Frisk v. Search incidental to lawful arrest

• In a search incidental to a lawful arrest
• the precedent arrest determines the validity of the incidental search
• the legality of the arrest is questioned in a large majority of these cases
• whether an arrest was merely used as a pretext for conducting a search. 
• Stop-and-Frisk
• "limited protective search of outer clothing for weapons"
• while probable cause is not required to conduct a "stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a "stop and frisk"

Luz v People (2012, GR No. 197788)

Rodel Luz v People

G.R. No. 197788, February 29, 2012

 

Facts:

            In March 2003, Luz was flagged down by the police for driving a motorcycle without helmet, in violation of an ordinance. Luz was invited to the nearby police sub-station, and while he was there, the police noticed that Luz was uneasy and holding something in his pocket. Upon instruction by the police, Luz took out the contents of his pocket, among which was shabu and a swiss knife.

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless search and seizure following an arrest for a traffic violation was valid.

 

Held: There was no valid arrest. Roadside questioning of a motorist is not considered as custodial interrogation nor arrest.

 

Under RA 4136, the general procedure for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the driver’s license of the latter. The PNP Operations Manual also provides that in cases of traffic violations, mere issuance of citation ticket or violation report is needed, and there is no need for conversing with the driver. 

 

At the time that he was waiting for his citation ticket, Luz could not be said to have been "under arrest." Arrestis the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. There was no intention to arrest Luz, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely as waiting time. 

 

Usual traffic stop is more analogous to “Terry stop”. The comparatively nonthreatening character of detentions of this sort explains the absence of any suggestion that they are subject to the dictates of Miranda. 

There are two features of a traffic stop: 

 

1.     detention of a motorist pursuant to a traffic stop is presumptively temporary and brief

 

2.     circumstances associated with the typical traffic stop are not such that the motorist feels completely at the mercy of the police, for instance, because the typical traffic stop is public

 

Lastly, while Luz may have failed to object to the illegality of his arrest at the earliest opportunity, a waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not, mean a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.

 

 

 

 

 

 

People v Yau (2014, G.R. No. 208170)

People v Petrus and Susana Yau

G.R. No. 208170, August 20, 2014

Yau spouses were charged with kidnapping for ransom and illegal detention of an American lawyer. They questioned the validity of the warrantless arrest. SC: Yau spouses failed to question the validity of their arrest before arraignment, thus any objection is deemed waived. EVEN IF the arrest was illegal, this cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability.

 

Facts:

            Petrus was charged as principal of kidnapping for ransom and serious illegal detention (RPC A267), while Susana was charged as accomplice, allegedly for the kidnapping of an American lawyer (Alastair Onglingswam) in January 2004, while the victim hailed a cab driven by Petrus in Mandaluyong City. Alastair was kept for 22 days in a house owned by Susana, until the police rescued Alastair. The offenders allegedly demanded for 600K USD ransom.

 

            According to the police, during the rescue operation on February 11, 2004, the police flagged down Petrus’ cab, asked him to scroll down his window and was told that the vehicle was being used to victimize foreign nationals. Petrus did not offer to make any comment. Hence, this prompted the officers to ask for his name and since he answered that he was Petrus Yau, a British national, they asked him for his driver’s license and car registration but appellant was not able to produce any. Since he could not produce any driver’s license and car registration, they were supposed to bring him to the police station for investigation, however, when shown a picture of private complainant and asked if he knew him, he answered that the man is being kept in his house. He was immediately informed that he was being placed under arrest for kidnapping private complainant Alastair Onglingswam after being informed of his constitutional rights. Petrus brought the police to his house, and there they found Alastair.

 

            According to Petrus, he went to his wife Susana in her shop and after he alighted from his car, 3 men bigger than him held his hands, pushed him inside their van and beat him until he became unconscious. When he regained consciousness, he was inside an airconditioned room. He was still restrained and blindfolded, and then was beat up. They accused him of being a kidnapper, to which he replied that he was not. He pleaded to them to allow him to make a call to the British Embassy, his friends and his wife, but to no avail. The following day, he was brought to and detained at the PACER Custodial Center.

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest was valid.

 

Held: The accused are deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrest because they failed to raise the objection before they entered their pleas.

 

Any objection to the procedure followed in the matter of the acquisition by a court of jurisdiction over the person of the accused must be opportunely raised before he enters his plea; otherwise, the objection is deemed waived. 

 

The accused-appellants never objected to or questioned the legality of their warrantless arrests or the acquisition of jurisdiction by the RTC over their persons before they entered their respective pleas to the kidnapping for ransom charge. Considering this lapse and coupled with their full and active participation in the trial of the case, accused-appellants were deemed to have waived any objection to their warrantless arrests. 

 

The accused-appellants voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the RTC thereby curing whatever defects that might have attended their arrest. It bears stressing that the legality of the arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the court over their persons. Their warrantless arrests cannot, by themselves, be the bases of their acquittal.

 

Even assuming arguendo that the accused-appellants made a timely objection to their warrantless arrests, jurisprudence is replete with rulings that support the view that their conviction was proper despite being illegally arrested without a warrant. In People v. Manlulu, the Court ruled that the illegality of the warrantless arrest cannot deprive the State of its right to prosecute the guilty when all other facts on record point to their culpability. Indeed, the illegal arrest of an accused is not a sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a sufficient complaint after a trial free from error.

 

 

 

 

Pestilos et al v Generoso and People (2014, G.R. No. 182601)

Joey Pestilos et al v Atty. Moreno Generoso and People

G.R. No. 182601 November 10, 2014

 

 

Facts:

            In February 2005, petitioners, and Atty. Generoso had an altercation in the latter’s house, and the latter called the police who came to render assistance. The police saw Generoso badly beaten. Generoso pointed to the petitioners as the ones who mauled him, thus the police “invited” them to Batasan Hills Police Station.

 

            They allegedly stabbed Generoso, but the latter survived. As such, the petitioners were charged with attempted murder. 

 

    They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.

 

Issue: W/N the “invitation” by the police was a valid warrantless arrest.

 

Held: There was valid warrantless arrest.

The arresting officers went to the scene of the crime upon the complaint of Atty. Generoso of his alleged mauling; the police officers responded to the scene of the crime less than one (1) hour after the alleged mauling; the alleged crime transpired in a community where Atty. Generoso and the petitioners reside; Atty. Generoso positively identified the petitioners as those responsible for his mauling and, notably, the petitioners85 and Atty. Generoso lived almost in the same neighborhood; more importantly, when the petitioners were confronted by the arresting officers, they did not deny their participation in the incident with Atty. Generoso, although they narrated a different version of what transpired.

With these facts and circumstances that the police officers gathered and which they have personally observed less than one hour from the time that they have arrived at the scene of the crime until the time of the arrest of the petitioners, we deem it reasonable to conclude that the police officers had personal knowledge of facts or circumstances justifying the petitioners' warrantless arrests. These circumstances were well within the police officers' observation, perception and evaluation at the time of the arrest. These circumstances qualify as the police officers' personal observation, which are within their personal knowledge, prompting them to make the warrantless arrests.

 

 

Doctrine:

 

-       History of warrantless arrests:

o   Prior to the 1940 Rules, the actual commission of the offense was not necessary in determining the validity of the warrantless arrest. Too, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause (or reasonable suspicion) applied both as to whether a crime has been committed and whether the person to be arrested has committed it.

o   Under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." Additionally, the determination of probable cause, or reasonable suspicion, was limited only to the determination of whether the person to be arrested has committed the offense.

o   More restrictive 1985 Rules of Court: it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for investigation.

§  Changes adopted to minimize arrests based on hearsay:

·      1) the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and

·       2) the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it.

People v Gerente (1993, G.R. Nos. 95847-48)

People v Gabriel Gerente

G.R. Nos. 95847-48. March 10, 1993

 

Facts:

In April 1990, policemen received a report of a mauling incident and after receiving reports from the hospital officials, and they went to the scene of the crime. They arrested Gerente 3 hours after Gerente and his companions killed Blace. Blace was found dead in the hospital where they found the instruments of death: a piece of wood and a concrete hollow block which the killers had used. The eye-witness, Edna Edwina Reyes, reported the happening to the policemen and pinpointed her neighbor, Gerente, as one of the killers. 

 

 

Issue: W/N the warrantless arrest was valid.

 

Held: The warrantless arrest was valid since the policemen had personal knowledge of the violent death of Blace and of facts indicating that Gerente and two others had killed him. If they had postponed his arrest until they could obtain a warrant, he would have fled the law as his two companions did.

 

The search conducted on Gerente's person was likewise lawful because it was made as an incident to a valid arrest (Section 12, Rule 126). The frisk and search of appellant's person upon his arrest was a permissible precautionary measure of arresting officers to protect themselves, for the person who is about to be arrested may be armed and might attack them unless he is first disarmed.

People v Tirso Acol (1994, GR Nos. 106288-89)

 

People v Tirso Acol

G.R. Nos. 106288-89, May 17, 1994

 

Facts:

            Pio Boses and Tirso Acol were apprehended after they allegedly staged a hold-up inside a jeep in September 1990, but they were charged for possession of two unlicensed firearms and bullets. 

 

            After the hold-up, the passengers of the jeep went to report the incident to the police, who searched Fort Bonifacio, saw four men, two of whom were Boses and Acol. They found guns in their possession and a jacket owned by one of the victims. They were apprehended but Acol escaped during trial. 

 

Issue: W/N the arrest was valid despite the lack of warrant of arrest. 

 

Held: The arrest is a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b) of Rule 113.

 

Inasmuch as the police team was formed and dispatched to look for the persons responsible for the crime on account of the information relayed by the victims.

 

Since Acol's arrest was lawful, it follows that the search made incidental thereto was valid. Moreover, the unlicensed firearms were found when the police team apprehended the accused for the robbery and not for illegal possession of firearms and ammunition.