Abejo v COA (2022, G.R. No. 251967)

 Bernadette Abejo (Exec Dir of ICAB) v COA

June 14, 2022, G.R. No. 251967

Abejo approved the additional renumeration given to ICAB members who helped in the workload of ICPC when there was a heavy load of applications in 2008-2010. COA said the same had no legal basis. SC: the disallowance was valid, but Abejo, due to good faith, cannot be held liable to return.

Facts: 

    The 1995 Inter-Country Adoption Act (RA 8043) created ICAB, which is the central authority in matters relating to inter-country adoption and policy-making body for carrying out RA 8043. 

    The Inter-Country Adoption Placement Committee (ICPC) is under the direction of ICAB, is tasked to screen, review, evaluate, and eventually decide upon and approve applications of prospective adoptive parents (or PAPs Dossiers).

    Allegedly, there was a heavy load of applications from 2008-2010, thus, ICAB members were asked to help with the review of PAPs Dossiers. Unnumbered memoranda were issued by the undersecretary to compensate the ICAB members.

    COA disallowed the additional renumeration on the following basis: (1) grant has no legal basis, (2) contrary to DBM BC No. 2003-5 and Sec. 49 of RA 9970 (GAA), (3) the Legal Service of DSWD issued a memorandum denying the grant, and (4) Sec 5 of RA 8043 states that ICAB members are only entitled to a per diem of 1,500.

Issues: 

1. W/N COA correctly disallowed the additional remuneration given to ICAB members.

2. W/N Abejo, as Executive Director and approving officer, should be held liable.  

Held: The disallowance is AFFIRMED, but Abejo is ABSOLVED from her solidary liability to return the disallowed amount.

1. While additional work done outside of a government official's regular function may be compensated, the grant of such compensation must still be in accordance with the applicable laws and rules.

    Honorarium cannot be demanded as a matter of right, and the granting of the same must follow the relevant rules. RA 8043 and DBM BC No. 2003-5 prevents ICAB members from receiving additional compensation for the work they have done reviewing PAPs Dossiers. Further, this is not a special project as referred to in RA 9970 (Sec 49). 

    RA 8043 is clear as to the limit of the amount per diem the ICAB members are to receive.

    DBM BC No. 2003-5 prohibits the payment of honoraria to officers already receiving per diem, e.g. ICAB members. 

2. Badges of good faith could be appreciated in favor of Abejo. No prior disallowance of the same benefit has been adjudged against ICAB. There is also no precedent disallowing a similar case in jurisprudence.

Doctrines:

• general rule (procedural): 
• the filing of an MOR is an indispensable condition before the special civil action for certiorari could be availed of.
• XPNS according to Del Rosario v ABS-CBN (Sep 2020, G.R. No. 202481, etc).
• Madera Rules (Madera v COA, G.R. NO. 244128, Sept 8, 2020)
• set of rules in determining the liability of government officers and employees being made to return employee benefits that were disallowed in audit:
1. If a Notice of Disallowance is set aside by the Court, no return shall be required from any of the persons held liable therein.
2. If a Notice of Disallowance is upheld, the rules on return are as follows:
• If in good faith, in regular performance of official functions, and with the diligence of a good father of the family, they are not liable to return.
• If in bad faith, malice, or gross negligence, liable to return

Gatchalian v Urrutia (2022, G.R. No. 223595)

 Sherwin T. Gatchalian v Romeo V. Urrutia

March 16, 2022, G.R. No. 223595

Facts:

    This is a review of a CSC decision. 

    Gatchalian is a former Mayor while Urrutia was a Records Officer in the Council Secretariat.

    In January 2012, Elizabeth Laron, an OJT working in the City Government of Valenzuela Employees Cooperative, lodged a complaint against Urrutia for sexual harassment committed in December 2011. Roberto Darilag, Chairman of the Personnel Complaints and Ethics Board (PCEB),  ordered Urrutia to submit his counter-affidavit, but before Urrutia could do the same, Darilag sent a letter to Laron advising her to amend her complaint to comply with the Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases (CSC Res. No. 01-0940). The Committee recommended that Gatchalian file a formal charge against Urrutia and preventively suspend him, which the former obliged.

    CSC dismisses the case. Ground: Urrutia was an employee of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, appointed by the Vice Mayor (Sec 456, LGC); thus, the Mayor is not authorized to issue a formal charge against Urrutia.

Issue: W/N the Mayor has no jurisdiction to discipline the SP employee (following the principle that the power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint).

Held: Gatchalian as mayor had the power to issue a formal charge and a preventive suspension order against Urrutia.

Sec 455(b)(1)(x) of LGC provides that the Mayor can cause to be instituted administrative or judicial proceedings against any official or employee of the city who may have committed and offense in the performance of his official duties.

Sec 87 of LGC also empowers the Chief Executive to impose appropriate penalty on erring subordinate employees under her/his jurisdiction.

Doctrines:

• Doctrine of implication in relation to Sec 456, LGC:
• VM's power to appoint employees of the SP carries with it the power to discipline the same employees
• General rule re appointment and discipline
• the power to appoint carries with it the power to discipline.
• XPN: the power to discipline/remove is expressly vested in another office or authority.
• CSC Res. No. 01-0940 (Rules on Sexual Harassment Cases)
• applies to government employees 
• Sec 7, Rule VI provides that the a Committee on Decorum and Investigation (CODI) must be constituted in all agencies with the original charter. 

SSS v Violeta Simacas (2022, G.R. No. 217866)

 SSS v. Violeta Simacas

June 20, 2022, G.R. No. 217866

Violeta's husband worked in a factory handling stainless steel. He was diagnosed with prostate cancer and died. Violeta claimed for death benefits which the Commission denied since prostate cancer is not listed as an occupational disease. SC: It suffices to establish that working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease.

Facts:

Irnido, husband of the appellee (Violeta) was a Fabricaiton Helper at FIELDSTAR from 1995 to 2010. Two years before retiring,  Irnido complained of back pains and incessant coughing. In 2010, he was diagnosed with "Benign Prostatic Hypertrophy (BHP) T/C (to consider) Prostatic Cancer and Pneumonia vs. Pulmonary Tuberculosis." He retired in February 2010, and died in July 2010.

Violeta filed a claim for employee's compensation benefits, denied by SSS (ground: the death was a non-occupational disease). It was ruled that prostatic adenocarcinoma or prostate cancer was not considered an occupational disease.

CA reversed the decision and ordered SSS to pay Violeta's claim for death benefits. Grounds:

• PD 626 is a social legislation that must be liberally interpreted in favor of claims
• It was impossible to present evidence of causal relation since the specific cause for prostate caner is medically unknown.
• "obligation to present such impossible evidence...must, therefore, be deemed void"

Issue: W/N Violeta is entitled to death benefits under PD 626, as amended.

Held: Yes, Violeta is entitled to death benefits. A review of the records reveal that Violeta proved that Irnido's working conditions increased the risk of him contracting prostate cancer.

Violeta cited medical journals stating that work-related exposures to certain substances (e.g. chromium) have the potential of affecting the risk of getting prostate cancer. A study also stated that "workers engaged in the manufacturing or handling stainless steel are exposed to chromium at varying degrees".

Doctrines:

• For a non-occupational disease to be compensable, substantial evidence must be presented to prove that the risk of contracting the illness was aggravated by the employee's working conditions. 
• it suffices to establish that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions
• not necessary to show direct causal relation
• "It is enough that the hypothesis on which the claim is based is probable. Medical opinion to the contrary can be disregarded especially where there is some basis in the facts for inferring a work-connection. Probability not certainty is the touchstone." (Sarmiento v ECC, 1986)
• Substantial evidence: such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.
• LC defines sickness as: 
• any illness definitely accepted as an occupational disease listed by the Commission, or any illness caused by employment subject to proof that the risk of contracting the same is increased by working conditions.
• If non-occupational disease
• Proof must be shown that the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions

Ting v. Heirs of Lirio (2007, G.R. No. 168913)

 Rolando Ting v. Heirs of Diego Lirio 

March 14, 2007, G.R. No. 168913

Lirio applied for and was granted title to a lot in Cebu in 1976, and the Court ordered the issuance of the title in 1982. Ting applied for title to the same lot in 1997. In 2003, the heirs of Lirio used as basis the 1976 decision to dismiss the application of Ting. SC: court decisions in land registration constitutes res judicata even if the issuance of title is delayed.

Facts:

Lirio applied for and was granted title to a lot in Cebu in 1976, and the Court ordered the issuance of the title in 1982. Ting applied for title to the same lot in 1997. In 2003, the heirs of Lirio used as basis the 1976 decision to dismiss the application of Ting.

Issue: W/N the 1976 decision constitutes res judicata in the application of Ting in 1997.

Held: Yes, the 1976 decision constitutes res judicata. It becomes final when no appeal within the reglementary period is taken from a judgment of confirmation and registration.

Basis: Section 30 of PD 1529:

SEC. 30. When judgment becomes final; duty to cause issuance of decree. – The judgment rendered in a land registration proceeding becomes final upon the expiration of thirty days8 to be counted from the date of receipt of notice of the judgment. An appeal may be taken from the judgment of the court as in ordinary civil cases.

After judgment has become final and executory, it shall devolve upon the court to forthwith issue an order in accordance with Section 39 of this Decree to the Commissioner for the issuance of the decree of registration and the corresponding certificate of title in favor of the person adjudged entitled to registration. (Emphasis supplied)

Doctrines:

Ministerial duty, meaning

• they act under the orders of the court and the decree must be in conformity with the decision of the court and with the data found in the record, and they have no discretion in the matter. 
• However, if they are in doubt upon any point in relation to the preparation and issuance of the decree, it is their duty to refer the matter to the court. They act, in this respect, as officials of the court and not as administrative officials, and their act is the act of the court. They are specifically called upon to "extend assistance to courts in ordinary and cadastral land registration proceedings.

Section 6, Rule 39 of Rules of Court not applicable in land registration

• in the Rules of Court to the effect that judgment may be enforced within 5 years by motion, and after five years but within 10 years, by an action (Sec. 6, Rule 39.) 
• refers to civil actions 
• not applicable to special proceedings, such as a land registration case. 
• Reason: a party in a civil action must immediately enforce a judgment that is secured as against the adverse party, and his failure to act to enforce the same within a reasonable time as provided in the Rules makes the decision unenforceable against the losing party. 
• In special proceedings 
• purpose: to establish a status, condition or fact (SCF) 
• in land registration proceedings, the ownership by a person of a parcel of land is sought to be established. 
• After the ownership has been proved and confirmed by judicial declaration, no further proceeding to enforce said ownership is necessary, except when the adverse or losing party had been in possession of the land and the winning party desires to oust him therefrom.
• The decision in a land registration case, unless the adverse or losing party is in possession, becomes final without any further action, upon the expiration of the period for perfecting an appeal.

 

Esconde v J. Barlongay (1987, G.R. No. L-67583)

 Basilisa Esconde v. Hon. Samilo Barlongay & Ramon Delfin

July 31, 1987, G.R. No.  L-67583

Delfin applied for registration of his title to his land, with due notice to the Escondes based on documents during the initial hearing and survey. Esconde refused to leave the land despite the writ of possession. SC: The whole world, including the Escondes, is bound to the title. Action for reconveyance is not proper as there was no showing of irregularity or fraud in the subject title registration proceedings.

Facts:

    In 1969, Delfin applied for registration of title at the CFI and was granted in the same year. OTC No. -05002 was issued in 1971, and in 1978, Delfin filed a Petition for Writ of Possession against spouses Esconde. Esconde also filed a complaint for reconveyance against Delfin. 

    The writ of possession was issued and the sheriff delivered the property to Delfin, but Esconde re-entered the premisses. In 1983, Delfin filed a Motion for an Alias Writ of Possession. But Delfin was still barred by Esconde from entering the premises, and so the former asked for a writ of demolition for the removal of any construction of the Esconde family.

Issue: W/N the Escondes are bound by the certificate of title when they claim to only come to know of the land registration case upon receipt of petition for writ of possession?

Held: The Escondes are bound. There are records that they received due notice (in the notice of initial hearing they were said to have appeared, and in the survey notification letter, Esconde's husband signed as one of the adjoining owners present.

    Land registration proceedings are valid and conclusive against the whole world. The land registration is binding on the whole world because “by the description in the notice (of initial hearing of the application for registration) “To Whom It May Concern,” all the world are made parties defendant.”

    Reconveyance is not the proper remedy in this case because there is no proof of irregularity in the issuance of title. It was also not established that there was fraud.

Doctrines:

• The applicable law in this case is Act 496 as PD 1529 was enacted only in Jan. 23, 1979.

• It is a settled doctrine that when a decree of registration has been obtained by fraud, the party defrauded has only one year from entry of the decree to file a petition for review before a competent court, provided that the land has not been transferred to an innocent purchaser for value

• There is no question that notice to her husband is notice to her under the law, her husband being the administrator of the conjugal partnership (Art. 165, Civil Code).

Reconveyance as a remedy

• remedy granted to the rightful owner of land which has been wrongfully or erroneously registered in the name of another for the purpose of compelling the latter to transfer or reconvey the land to him
• does not bar a landowner whose property was wrongfully or erroneously registered under the Torrens System from bringing an action, after one year from the issuance of the decree, for the reconveyance of the property in question. 
• does not aim or purport to re-open the registration proceeding and set aside the decree of registration,
• does not seek to set aside the decree 
• respecting the decree as incontrovertible and no longer open to review, seeks to transfer or reconvey the land from the registered owner to the rightful owner 
• Prescription: An action for reconveyance of real property on the ground of fraud must be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place from the issuance of an original certificate of title

Castillo v Escutin (2009, G.R. No. 171056)

 Dinah C. Castillo v. Antonio Escutin et al.

March 13, 2009, G.R. No. 171056

Castillo's tax declaration was cancelled and around the same time, Summit Realty's TCT over the same lot was issued based on the title of Catigbac. As ROD and City Assessor's Office has processed the documents of Summit, Castillo charged them with violation of RA 3019 on corrupt practices. SC: the title of Catigbac has superior right over the tax declaration of Castillo. Absent any sign of irregularities, the officers cannot be charged with corrupt practices.

Facts:

    Castillo filed charges against the respondents for violation of RA 3019 for allegedly cancelling her TCT in favor of Summit Realty. Castillo was a judgement credit of Moratilla, and to satisfy said judgment Castillo went after Lot 13713 co-owned by Moratilla. Said lot was part of the area which Summit applied for conversion from agricultural landholding to residential, commercial, and recreational uses.

    To satisfy the judgment credit, said lot was subject to public auction sale in May 2002, and Castillo bought 1/3 pro-indiviso share of the lot. Castillo then obtained Tax Declaration 00942-A for the same. When Castillo attempted to pay real estate taxes, she found out that her TD was cancelled, and the area was encompassed in TCT No. 129642 and TD 00949-A in the name of Francisco Catigbac, and supposedly sold to Summit.

    In July 2002, TCT 129642 was cancelled and TCT T-134609 was issued in favor of Summit. As such, Castillo charted several public officers for the said cancellation and transfer of ownership of the subject lot. 

    

Issue: W/N the tax declaration of Castillo can be cancelled on the basis of Section 109 of PD 1529.

Held: Petition has no merit.  Section 109 provides for the issuance of a lost duplicate certificate of title, and not related to the cancellation of Castillo's tax declaration. The cancellation of Castillo's TD was based on the fact that the same lot is covered by TCT 181 and subsequently by TCT No. 129642.

   Accordingly, Summit bought Lot 1-B from Catigbac (through his AIF, Yagin), and thus TCT No. 181 in the name of Catigbac was issued covering the purchased lot, on which the sale was registered in Summit's favor. Lot 1-B was separated from Lot 1, and TCT 129642 was issued in the name of Catigbac and then the same was cancelled and replaced by TCT No. T-134609 in the name of Summit.

    Since Lot 1-B is already covered by a tax declaration in the name of Catigbac, accordingly, any other tax declaration for the same property or portion thereof in the name of another person, not supported by any certificate of title, such that of petitioner, must be cancelled; otherwise, the City Assessor would be twice collecting a realty tax from different persons on one and the same property.

Title v Certificate of title

• Title: lawful cause or ground of possessing that which is ours
• the foundation of ownership of property (real or personal)
• that which constitutes a just cause of exclusive possession
• Certificate of Title: mere evidence of ownership
• not the title of the land itself

Doctrines:

• two systems of land registration 
• the registration of an instrument under the wrong system produces no legal effect
• these systems are separate and distinct from each other
1. Torrens system for registered lands under the Property Registration Decree
2. System of registration for unregistered land under Act No. 3344 (now Section 113 of the Property Registration Decree)

People v Pangilinan (2007, G.R. No. 171020)

 

People of the Philippines v Alfredo Pangilinan

March 14, 2007, G.R. No. 171020

Pangilinan was charged with two counts of rape against his daughter. After the hearings for the petition of bail concluded, the trial ensued without arraignment, thereafter, the court scheduled his arraignment and then the case was submitted for decision. Accused: the delay in the arraignment violated his right to be informed of the accusation against him. SC: No, the defect was cured by the accused's active participation in trial, indicating that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

Facts:

            Pangilinan was charged with two counts of rape for raping his daughter, AAA (11 years old) in 1995 and in 1997. Timeline of the case was as follows:

• March 19, 1997: Pangilinan  was arrested
• May 5, 1997: Pangilinan arrested and detained with no bail recommended. Thereafter, accused filed a petition for bail and hearings for the petition for bail followed. Prosecution presented AAA's mother and the doctor who examined AAA as witnesses. Pangilinan was his sole witness.
• April 23, 1998: RTC denied Pangilinan's petition for bail (ground: the evidence against the accused is strong)
• June 9, 1999: RTC scheduled his arraignment
• June 17, 1999: accused pleaded not guilty, and in September, the court found him guilty.

        Accused appealed his conviction on the ground that he was arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision. An irregularity and a procedural error which is prejudicial to the accused and tantamount to denial of his constitutional right to be informed of the accusation against him. 

Issue: W/N arraignment after the case was submitted for decision was a violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the accusation against him. 

Held: Pangilinan's belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.  His counsel also actively participated in the hearings, which is a clear indication that he was fully aware of the charges against him.

            Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him.

                It's purpose is to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. Or at the very least to inform him of why the prosecuting arm of the sate is mobilized against him. 

Doctrine:

• three principles in determining the guilt of the accused in rape cases

1. an accusation of rape can be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult to prove, it is even difficult for the accused to disprove

2. there are only two persons involved in this crime, and as such the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with great caution

3. The evidence of the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the evidence for the defense.

            

• Rule on affidavits: being taken ex parte, they are almost always incomplete and often inaccurate for lack of searching inquiries but he investigating officer or du got partial suggestions, and are thus generally considered to be inferior to the testimony given in open court.

• It is when the testimony (in rape cases) appears totally flawless that a court might have some misgiving on its veracity. This is especially true in rape cases where victims are not expected to have a total recall of the incident.